A common approach to demands for lawful access to encrypted data is to allow a trusted third party (TTP) to gain access to private data. However, there is no way to verify that this trust is well placed as the TTP may open all messages indiscriminately. Moreover, existing approaches do not scale well when, in addition to the content of the conversation, one wishes to hide one's identity. Given the importance of metadata this is a major problem. We propose a new approach in which users can retroactively verify cryptographically whether they were wiretapped. As a case study, we propose a new signature scheme that can act as an accountable replacement for group signatures, accountable forward and backward tracing signatures.
Introduction
For digital communication there are few scaling issues to prevent mass surveillance and, indeed, no easy way to detect it. To ensure privacy, we rely on cryptographic guarantees. These are one of the best tools to prevent such surveillance: even if there is a "political" solution to one's own government's spying, there are always other governments, and in both cases there is the added difficulty of actually verifying that (covert) surveillance isn't occurring.
Cryptographic protections, on the other hand, are absolute. However, precisely because they are inviolable, widespread deployment of such systems, e.g., in cloud services, often raises governmental objections or requires mandated ways of providing access. A commonly proposed solution for lawful access to encrypted communications is to appoint a trusted party (or multiple Markulf Kohlweiss: Microsoft Research, E-mail: markulf@microsoft.com *Corresponding Author: Ian Miers: The Johns Hopkins University, E-mail: imiers@cs.jhu.edu partially-trusted parties) who escrow(s) a user's identity or information about her actions for future retrieval. This has been applied to anonymous signatures [8, 10] , e-cash schemes [9] , and even saw very limited (and ultimately failed) real-world deployment in the form of the Clipper chip for encryption. Indeed, the US and several other countries are currently trying to mandate the adoption of such techniques. However, especially in light of recent revelations about the intelligence industry, it should be clear that such proposals make cryptographic protections against mass surveillance worthless:
First, in the face of nation-states that are willing to compromise hardware, penetrate systems, and coerce individuals, such an approach seems foolhardy. Eventually the trusted party's key or unfettered access to it will be extracted even if the party is itself trustworthy.
Second, escrow systems typically fail to hide metadata: users' messages are encrypted with an escrowed key, but nothing hides envelope information. This is seemingly a fundamental limitation: if a user's messages can easily be located (and subsequently decrypted with an escrowed key), then the privacy protections are severely lacking as such a system leaks metadata-i.e., who messages are going to and coming from. If it is impossible to locate a user's message given their name, locating the messages to decrypt relies on expensive operations such as trial decryption with every escrowed key. This does not scale.
The question thus is, can we meet the requirements for providing lawful access while still allowing cryptographic systems that prevent dragnet surveillance of either messages or metadata? We begin with three insights:
1. There can be no central decryption key, since we cannot trust anyone to hold it. 2. Even after raising suspicion, a user will likely interact with the communication system (e.g., by logging in again). If they were cautious enough not to do so, they would be using existing end-to-end secure schemes already. 3. We do not need to prevent the authorities from abusing their position. Merely detecting if they do it, serves as a deterrent for mass surveillance.
We feel this approach in general is quite promising. In this paper, we apply it to a somewhat more theoretical problem: building a group signature like schemewhich we call an accountable tracing signature-where the group manager can, on a recurring basis, (i) choose which users' messages they have the ability to open and (ii) prove that they did not have the ability to open the messages of a given user. Similar to placing a GPS tracker on a car or wiretapping a phone, this only provides information going forwards. We then extend this to allow retroactive access and the escrow of keys, rather than just user identities. Group signatures are a useful starting point with well studied cryptographic definitions. They allow anonymity revocation by a group manager while still providing privacy to everyone else. Moreover, they are readily extendable to key escrow: many group signature schemes are a signature scheme plus an escrow mechanism for the users' identity. Including a decryption key in addition to the identity is simple. Additionally, by starting with group signatures, we inherit the strong guarantees that allow the group manager to prove that someone authored a message if-and-only-if they actually did so, i.e., she cannot frame users. While this property is understandably neglected in many escrow schemes, given the legal context in which escrowed messages are likely to be used as evidence in court, attribution seems to be a fundamental property that should be dealt with. Finally, group signatures are third party verifiable, enabling an untrusted mail transport agent or telecom switch to verify that messages comply with required lawful access requests without itself having that access.
In group signatures, however the group manager can open any message and is simply trusted not to. For accountable escrow, this is not the case and the group manager is fundamentally an adversary who seeks to actively violate user privacy. We model this by adding two additional games. The first one-acountable anonymityensures that the group manager cannot both trace a user and provide proof that they did not do so. The secondtrace obliviousness-ensures that users cannot tell if they are traceable or not (whereas in standard group signatures, the user knows they are always traced).
Our approach to constructing a scheme meeting these is as follows: as in a group signature, users escrow their identity under an escrow public key as part of the signature. Normally, however, their private key is not known to the authority. When a user resubscribes (e.g., pays their monthly phone bill or logs into a webmail account), the authority searches them by either (i) replacing that key with one the authority can decrypt, or (ii) requiring the user to provide the escrow private key encrypted under an authority provided key. The former results in tracing going forward-anything the user does going forward is detectable-while the latter allows backward tracing as well and reveals past actions. In case a user is not traced, the authority does not replace keys and merely re-randomizes the existing public key.
The core of this approach is a key-oblivious encryption scheme where public keys are randomizable and randomized keys cannot be linked to each other or the original key. As a result, without the entropy used in key randomization, users cannot tell if their key was replaced-as in the case of forward tracing-or if they are encrypting to a random group element or the authority's public key-as in the case of backward tracing. Because users cannot tell if either search mechanism was invoked, users remain oblivious. However, once the randomness is revealed, the authority is held accountable.
Our Contribution
We provide four contributions. First, we propose accountability as a novel security requirement of escrow systems and formalize it in the definitions for accountable tracing signatures. Second, we provide a practical construction for an accountable forward-tracing signature complete with proofs of security. This allows an authority to covertly and accountably tag and trace user messages once the user becomes suspect. Third, we extend our approach with an interactive subscribe protocol to build an accountable backward-tracing signature scheme where all of a user's messages can be identified even retroactively. Finally, we show how to augment either approach to create an accountable tracing signcryption scheme where messages are encrypted and opening a signature reveals both the author and the message content, giving us an efficient accountable wiretapping system.
Related work
Several cryptographic schemes, both from the academic literature and in practice, use a trusted party for escrow. For example, in a group signature scheme [8] , a group manager allows users to sign messages as coming from some member of the group while he alone maintains the ability to provably identify who signed the message. A related problem is given a suspicious user, identify all messages they have authored. Systems that support both functionalities are called traceable signatures [14] .
Variants of these properties have been defined for e-cash systems, with owner tracing, and coin tracing being defined analogously. Interestingly there are e-cash schemes that hold the authority accountable [15, 16] . Unfortunately, these schemes require interaction with the tracing authority for every transaction and, as a result, the techniques do not necessarily scale.
Finally, key escrow, where an encrypted message can be decrypted by both the recipient and an escrow authority, is both a well studied topic and one that has seen at least limited real world deployment in the (failed) Clipper chip. A key escrow mechanism in which multiple trustees need to collaborate to decrypt has been proposed by [18] .
Key-oblivious encryption
We call a public-key encryption scheme key-oblivious if (i) it allows for a large set of public keys all related to the same secret key, if (ii) existing public keys can be randomized to generate related keys, and if (iii) it cannot be discerned, without knowledge of the secret key and the randomness used in their generation, how public keys are related. The existence of such schemes is cryptographic folklore and we do not claim much novelty here. In order to allow for accountability, we insist on the ability to prove, for a given public key, which key was randomized to produce it. This leads to slight variants of the standard key-privacy and plaintextindistinguishability games.
Syntax
We formalize a key-oblivious encryption scheme OE as a collection OE.(GroupGen, KeyGen, KeyRand, Enc, Dec) of five algorithms:
generates parameters, usually a prime order group. KeyGen(G) → (pk, sk): generates a key pair. KeyRand(pk) → pk : randomizes an existing public key into a public key for the same secret key. Enc(pk, m) → ct: standard encryption functionality. Dec(sk, ct) → m: standard decryption functionality.
In definitions and in protocols, we sometimes make the randomness of KeyRand explicit and write (pk ; r) ← KeyRand(pk) and pk = KeyRand(pk; r). For two fixed random public keys pk (0) , pk (1) , pk = KeyRand(pk (b) ; r) acts as a hiding and binding bit commitment scheme, with r its opening. (Similarly, we write (ct; s) ← Enc(pk, m) and ct = Enc(pk, m; s) to make the randomness of Enc explicit in zero-knowledge proofs.)
Definitions
In addition to key randomizability-which corresponds to the bit commitment being hiding, we require that ciphertexts are plaintext indistinguishable even when the adversary can randomize the target keys. We term this plaintext indistinguishability under key randomization (INDr). We also require such schemes to be key private [5] , again with the modification that this holds even for adversarially randomized keys. Even though stronger variants of these properties exist, security under chosen plaintext attacks suffices for our purposes. We note that any key randomizable encryption scheme can be made key private via the added step of randomizing the public key prior to encryption. 
Instantiation
Intuitively key-oblivious encryption can be obtained from key-private homomorphic public-key encryption. For a given key pair, let C(m; r) be the ciphertext of message m with randomness r. Consider the homomor-
We construct a key-oblivious encryption scheme by letting each oblivious public key corresponds to an encryption C(1; r). We randomize a key by computing C(1; r * r ) for a random r (this can be computed using ⊗ by square-and-multiply). Encryption corresponds to computing C(m; r + s) by multiplying a freshly randomized public key C(1; r + s) with the ciphertext C(m; 0), i.e., the message encrypted with randomness zero-see also [11] .
We will use such a simple construction of keyoblivious encryption based on ElGamal (ElKO): ElKO.GroupGen(1 λ ): Pick a group G of prime order q with generator g, and return
ElKO.KeyRand(pk): Let pk = (A, B), sample r ← Z q , return pk = (A r , B r ) and randomness r.
ElKO.Enc(pk, m): Let pk = (A, B), sample s ← Z q , and
Lemma 4 (Key privacy of ElKO). If the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem holds in G, ElKO is a keyprivate key-oblivious encryption scheme.

Lemma 5 (Key randomizability of ElKO). If the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem holds in G,
ElKO is a keyrandomizable encryption scheme.
Lemma 6 (Plaintext indistinguishability of ElKO). If the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem holds in G,
ElKO satisfies INDr.
SIG and OTS
To ensure efficiency, we need structure-preserving signatures (SPS) [4] . SPS can either be proved secure in the generic group model [3] , using q-type assumptions [4] , or using static assumptions [1] . Usually the stronger the assumption, the better the performance. This gives us several options. Moreover, if we only use the signature scheme to sign freshly created one-time signature (OTS) public keys, we do not require full adaptive unforgeability, but it suffices if the signature scheme is secure for random messages. We can thus use the xSIG scheme from [1] secure under DDH 2 and xDLIN 1 with |σ sig | = 6. For the OTS scheme, which does not need to be structure preserving, on the other hand, we will always make use of the scheme of [13] with |pk ots | = 2 and |σ ots | = 2. Note that the xSIG scheme requires random messages of a specific form, and thus requires extended pk ots of size 2 × 3 = 6.
Accountable forward-traceable signatures
In a group signature scheme, a group manager can open any suspect message. In a tracing signature scheme, the manager can test if any message belongs to a suspect user. In an accountable tracing signature, the manager can do the same but must later reveal which users she deems suspect.
Syntax
We formalize an accountable tracing signature scheme ATS as a collection ATS.(Setup, GKg, UKg, Enroll, Sign, Verify, Open, Judge, Account) of nine algorithms:
Generates the public parameters for security level λ. GKg(gp) → (gpk, gsk): Generates the initial group key pair.
UKg(gp) → (upk, usk):
Generates a user key pair. Each user has a public key upk and a corresponding private key usk. Per [6] this is necessary to provide any meaning to the assertion that a user actually did sign an opened message: without it, the group manager is free to simply assert that a key of their generation actually belongs to a user.
The authority produces a certificate on a user's escrow public key. This certificate either provides full anonymity (t = 0) or allows for tracing (t = 1) depending on the bit t. The authority stores the witness w escrw to t and returns the certificate to the user. The certificate cert contains the time range for which the user is enrolled. We call this counter the epoch of the certificate. Sign(gpk, cert, usk, m) → σ : Takes the group public key, a certificate, the user's private key, and a message to sign as input. It outputs a signature that may contain an escrow of the user's identity. The epoch of the signature corresponds to the epoch of the certificate. Verify(gpk, m, σ, epoch) → {0, 1}: Given the group public key, a message, its signature, and an epoch, verifies the signature is valid for the specified message and epoch. Open(gpk, gsk, m, σ, epoch) → (upk, ψ): Given the group public key, private key, a message, its signature, and the time interval; if possible (i.e., if signed using an escrow certificate), return the public key of the user and a proof that the user generated the message-signature pair. Otherwise returns ⊥. Judge(gpk, m, σ, epoch, upk, ψ) → {0, 1}: Given the group public key, a message, its signature, an epoch, a user's public key, and a proof that the user generated the signature of that epoch on that message, verifies the proof. Account(gpk, cert, w escrw , t) → {0, 1}: Given the group public key, a certificate, a bit t saying whether it escrows the user's identity, and a witness w escrw , returns 1 if the witness confirms the choice of t.
We will expose some implementation details for the sake of simplifying definitions and avoiding excessive scaffolding. We use cert.epoch to denote the epoch of a certificate, cert.upk to denote the user public key being certified, gpk.gp the parameters of the group public key, and gsk.csk to denote the certificate signing key-this makes an adversary with access to this key strictly stronger than an adversary with access to an ENROLL oracle.
Definitions
The games defining the properties of an accountable tracing signature are described formally in Figure 1 . We outline them informally here. The first three are just slight adaptations of the standard group signature games. The last two, anonymity with accountability and trace-obliviousness, are fundamentally different from the guarantees that group signatures can provide. These stem from the requirement to hold the group manager accountable. Anonymity under tracing This corresponds to the standard anonymity property of group signatures which guarantees anonymity toward everyone except the group manager. It ensures that even when being traced users are anonymous to the general public. Traceability Informally, traceability requires that every valid message will trace to someone as long as the adversary does not have a certificate and private key for a non-tracing certificate. Although the attacker is free to choose the type of certificate for honest users whose keys are generated by the UKG oracle, he is not allowed to get untraceable certificates on user keys of his choosing. In the definition this is ensured by (t ∨ upk / ∈ dom(S)) always evaluating to 1 on such occasions. This is a slight departure from the standard tracing game [6] , where ENROLL always produces traceable certificates. Non-frameability This requires that no one, not even the group manager, can sign messages on the user's behalf. At the same time, it guarantees that users, if they are being traced, have to take responsibility for the messages they sign, i.e., traced signatures ensure non-repudiation. Anonymity with accountability Intuitively, this captures the notion that the user is anonymous even from a corrupt authority that has full control of the system. It requires that even if every single parameter in the system is adversarially controlled, a user is anonymous as long as the escrow key in his certificate is accountably private. Trace-obliviousness This requires that users cannot tell whether they are being traced. 
Definition 7 (Anonymity under tracing). Let ATS be an accountable forward-tracing signature scheme. Consider the following game played by an adversary A:
Game AuT = b ← {0, 1} gp ← Setup(1 λ ) (gpk, gsk) ← GKg(gp) b ← A Ch,OPEN (gpk, gsk.csk) return (b = b) Oracle Ch(sk 0 , sk 1 , cert 0 , cert 1 , m, w escrw 0 , w escrw 1 , t) = σ 0 ← Sign(gpk, sk 0 , cert 0 , m) σ 1 ← Sign(gpk, sk 1 , cert 1 , m) if (σ 0 = ⊥ ∧ σ 1 = ⊥ ∧ cert 0 .epoch = cert 1 .epoch ∧ Account(gpk, cert 0 , w escrw 0 , t) ∧ Account(gpk, cert 1 , w escrw 1 , t)) Q ← Q ∪ {σ b } return σ b else return ⊥ Oracle OPEN(m, σ) = if (σ ∈ Q) then return ⊥ return Open(gsk, m, σ)Game Trace = gp ← Setup(1 λ ) (gpk, gsk) ← GKg(gp) (m, σ) ← A UKG,ENROLL,SIGN,OPEN (gpk) (upk, ψ) ← Open(gsk, m, σ) return ( Verify(gpk, m, σ) = 1 ∧ (m, σ) / ∈ Q ∧ (Judge(gpk, m, σ, upk, ψ) = 0 ∨ upk = ⊥) ) Oracle UKG(upk, epoch) = (upk, usk) ← UKg(gp) S[upk] ← usk return upk Oracle ENROLL(upk, epoch, t) = (cert, w escrw ) ← Enroll(gsk, upk, epoch, (t ∨ upk / ∈ dom(S))) return cert Oracle OPEN(m, σ) = (upk, ψ) ← Open(gsk, m, σ) return (upk, ψ) Oracle SIGN(cert, m) = usk = S[cert.upk] if (usk = ⊥) then return ⊥ σ ← Sign(gpk, cert, usk, m) Q ← Q ∪ {(m, σ)}; return σGame NF = gp ← Setup(1 λ ) (gpk, st) ← A 0 (gp) if gpk.gp = gp then return ⊥ (m, σ, upk, ψ) ← A UKG,SIGN 1 (st) return (Judge(gpk, m, σ, upk, ψ) = 1 ∧(m, σ) / ∈ Q ∧ upk ∈ S Oracle UKG(upk, epoch) = (upk, usk) ← UKg(gp) S[upk] ← usk return upk Oracle SIGN(cert, m) = usk = S[cert.upk] if (usk = ⊥) then return ⊥ σ ← Sign(gpk, cert, usk, m) Q ← Q ∪ {(m, σ)}; return σGame AwA = b ← {0, 1} gp ← Setup(1 λ ) (gpk, st) ← A 0 (gp) if gpk.gp = gp return ⊥ b ← A Ch 1 (st) return (b = b ) Oracle Ch(sk 0 , sk 1 , cert 0 , cert 1 , m, w escrw 0 , w escrw 1 )) = σ 0 = Sign(gpk, sk 0 , cert 0 , m) σ 1 = Sign(gpk, sk 1 , cert 1 , m) if (σ 0 = ⊥ ∧ σ 1 = ⊥ ∧ cert 0 .epoch = cert 1 .epoch ∧ Account(gpk, cert 0 , w escrw 0 , 0) ∧ Account(gpk, cert 1 , w escrw 1 , 0)) return σ b else return ⊥Game TO = gp ← Setup(1 λ ) (gpk, gsk) ← GKg(gp) b ← {0, 1} (b ) ← A Ch,ENROLL,OPEN (gpk) return (b = b ) Oracle OPEN(m, σ) = (upk, ψ) ← Open(gsk, m, σ) if upk ∈ U then return ⊥ else return (upk, ψ) Oracle ENROLL(upk, epoch, t) = (cert, w escrw ) ← Enroll(gsk, upk, epoch, t) return cert Oracle Ch(upk, epoch) = (cert, w escrw ) ← Enroll(gsk, upk, epoch, b) U = U ∪ {upk}; return cert
On the necessity of extra games
Although at first glance anonymity with accountability is similar to the standard anonymity property and may appear to subsumes it, this is not the case: even if the authority can lawfully trace a user, we still need to ensure that no one else can. From this, it appears that trace-obliviousness together with anonymity with accountability subsumes the standard anonymity property. After all, if a third party can track a traced user, then surely the user can use the same technique to detect their own status.
If anonymity under tracing were limited to generic third parties, this might be the case. However, in both standard group signature schemes and ours, it is useful to allow the opening authority to be distinct from the group manager for security reasons: the former is used infrequently while the latter is online continually to allow new members in. Ideally, compromise of the online portion ought not to violate users' privacy, and so the attacker in the anonymity under tracing game may get access to the online portion's state (gsk.csk). Traceobliviousness, however, cannot necessarily survive such a strong attack, as the group manager may know whose keys have been replaced. As a result, the games are distinct.
Remarks.
Note two things. First, if all keys are tracing keys, then (i) the trace game would be standard, (ii) the traceoblivious game is moot, and (iii) there is no accountable anonymity. As a result, we would have a standard group signature scheme. Perhaps more interestingly, if we dropped the requirement for anonymity under tracing, we would not require simulation extractability for the proof system. Note, moreover, that the anonymity under tracing adversary A provides all input to Ch. A simple hybrid argument thus shows that anonymity under tracing with a single challenge query implies security with multiple challenge queries. This means that even one-time simulation extraction is sufficient to prove security.
Accountable forward-tracing signatures from key-oblivious encryption
Assume we have an unforgeable signature scheme SIG.(GroupGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), a one-time signature scheme OTS.(GroupGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), a key-oblivious encryption scheme OE.(GroupGen, KeyGen, KeyRand, Enc, Dec), and a simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system Π.(GroupGen,Setup,Prove,VfyProof,SimExtSetup, Sim, Ext). (For efficiency we require that SIG.GroupGen = OTS.GroupGen = OE.GroupGen = Π.GroupGen and refer to this algorithm as GroupGen.)
We construct an accountable tracing scheme ATS:
The secret key sk (0) is discarded, in fact pk (0) should be generated in such a way that sk (0) is not known to any party. Outputs gp = (G, pk (0) , crs).
ATS.GKg(gp):
Runs (cpk, csk) ← SIG.Keygen(gp.G) and (pk (1) , sk (1) ) ← OE.KeyGen(gp.G). Returns gpk = (gp, cpk, opk = pk (1) ) and gsk = (gpk, csk, osk = sk (1) upk, σ u ) ). Computes a proof π using crs for the following relation to prove knowledge of (upk, epk, σ cert , σ u ):
Computes σ ots ← OTS.Sign(sk ots , (m, (escrw, pk ots , cpk, epoch), π)) and sets σ = (π, σ ots , pk ots , escrw). If ATS.Verify(gpk, m, σ) = 0, returns ⊥, otherwise returns σ. This check is needed as we guarantee anonymity even for maliciously formed inputs, as long as the signature verifies and the user is not being traced. We detail the concrete costs of instantiating such a scheme in Appendix A. Depending on techniques, a signature in our scheme requires between 155 and 367 group elements. Depending on the type of curve, group elements are between 32 and 128 bytes each for BN256 Curves with 128 bit security, this gives us a signature between 11Kb and 45Kb. This makes our scheme of mostly theoretical interest as a proof of concept. We note, however, that there may be substantial room for improvement. First, our construction simply uses stock parts and it's possible that a bespoke solution would give far better performance. Second, we use structure preserving signatures and Groth-Sahai proofs. It's possible that if we draw our stock parts from signatures with efficient protocols and verifiable encryption schemes, we will get a more efficient scheme. Similarly, schemes secure in the Random-Oracle model generally have more efficient protocols and our current construction is in the more expensive standard-model.
ATS.Verify(gpk, m, σ, epoch):
Backward-tracing and message-escrow extensions
We only formally describe and analyze a base scheme, though our approach can be extended in several directions to fit specific application requirements. We discuss two such extensions for applications that require backward-tracing and encryption respectively.
Accountable backward-tracing signatures
So far we have considered monitoring a suspect's future actions. In the case of recovering past actions, we cannot retroactively tag a message and must, instead, extract something from the user to identify her messages. With some applications (e.g., cloud based email), where users may maintain an encrypted inbox/outbox of their messages merely (accountably) extracting the necessary decryption key is sufficient. We can decrypt the inbox rather than resort to trial message decryption. For other applications, it seems search costs are on the order of m × t where m is the number of messages in the system and t is the number of targeted users.
In either case, retrieving the user's key introduces a second issue: restoring privacy. For forward tracing, the authority merely needs to replace the escrow key with a randomization of pk (0) when a warrant expires.
For backward tracing, things are more complicated as we need the user to replace her key with a new one without realizing she did so. This requires more than just key obliviousness: the user must only hold a share of her private key. If not, she can simply test if she can decrypt messages encrypted under the new key. We augment ElKO with a basic distributed key generation functionality to form DElKO. We model distributed key generation using the following algorithms: ShareGen(G) generates public and private key shares (ps, ss), while CombinePS and CombineSS combine a vector of public and private key shares into a public and a private key respectively. We extend ElKO with algorithms ShareGen, CombinePS and CombineSS for generating keys from public and private shares:
Returns (ps, ss).
Returns pk = (g r , ( ps i ) r ).
DElKO.CombineSS( ss):
Returns sk = ss i .
Adding backward tracing
An Accountable backward-tracing signature scheme is a set of eight algorithms: (Setup, GKg, UKg, Sign, Verify, Open, Judge, Account) and one protocol Subscribe(gpk, usk) ↔ Enroll (gsk, upk, b) .
Our construction is based on our forward-tracing scheme from Section 4 with two modifications (i) epk instead of being a key for ElKO is now for DElKO and (ii) we replace Enroll with an interactive protocol (Subscribe, Enroll), that handles key generation, key retrieval in the case of a warrant, and key renewal on warrant expiration.
Subscribe, detailed in Figure 2 , uses a blind decryption scheme [12] with algorithms BE.(KeyGen, Enc, Blind, BlindDec, UnBlind). Intuitively, in Subscribe, the user provides the authority with an encryption of her share of the escrow key. The authority can gain oblivious access to this share via a blind decryption query. To maintain trace-obliviousness, the authority normally issues blind decryption queries on an encryption of 0. Again, revealing the randomness-in this case for blinding the ciphertext-renders this accountable.
The process for key renewal is best understood via Figure 2 . It leverages the fact that a user, since she knows only shares of escrow keys, cannot tell at the end of subscription whether she holds an escrow key generated from an old share, a new share, or a randomized key shared with all traced users.
Extending to encryption and message escrow
Both signature schemes can be readily adapted to form an escrowed encryption scheme by having the message be a ciphertext and including in escrw a copy of the plaintext, and modifying the proof in the signature accordingly. Formally, such as scheme has ten algorithms: (Setup, GKg, UKg, Enroll, Signcrypt, Decrypt, Verify, Open, Judge, Account). Sign is replaced by Signcrypt and augmented to additionally take a public key under which the message is encrypted. These keys can either be from an external source or produced by UKg. The resulting "signature" can be decrypted by Decrypt only with the corresponding private key. Verify can still be run by anyone of course. Concretely, ATS.Sign becomes (σ, escrw) ← Signcrypt(gpk, cert, usk, m, pk):
Parse gpk as (cpk, crs, opk) and cert as (upk, epk, epoch). 
Transparency reports and conclusions
Accountable tracing signatures hold those who demand "lawful" access to encrypted messages accountable for what they access. With it, under some circumstances at least, demands for lawful access to cryptographic systems can be dealt with without allowing mass surveillance of message content and, crucially, metadata. For most ordinary criminal cases, the existence of a search warrant is already revealed when data obtained from it is used in court. Thus the requirement to reveal searches after the fact is innocuous. However, many of the more troubling issues stem from orders which demand both access and silence. Currently, many companies issue transparency reports purportedly giving statistical data about the volume of such requests. These, again, are not accountable. Using an ATS scheme or its message escrow variant, however, these transparency reports become provable. If every epk is stored in a public ledger, then the authority can easily issue zeroknowledge proofs (e.g., using an efficient instantiation of zkSNARKS [19] ) attesting that less than some fraction of its transactions use tracing keys for warrants accompanied by gag orders.
Accountable tracing signatures do not, of course, preclude the use of backdoors, software vulnerabilities, or other non-cryptographic attack vectors. However, given that they provide a vector for lawful access (and arguably bounded "unlawful" access to whatever extent the transparency report allows), they eliminate part of the motivation. Moreover, by potentially eliminating the lawful access objection to strong cryptography and allowing its deployment, they make mass surveillance far more difficult.
Our approach has two major limitations. First, While accountable tracing signatures hold the authority accountable, they obviously only do so after the fact. An attacker who controls the authority gets access to all data until they are detected. Thus, if the goal is to maximize security, such systems should be avoided unless the alternatives are a non-accountable escrow system or no cryptographic protections at all. Second, the current scheme we have is by no means efficient and improving it either by using more efficient primitives or relaxing the security requirements is an area for future work.
A Instantiation
We now detail how to instantiate our scheme using standard proof techniques.
A.1 Groth-Sahai proofs and simulation extraction
We will use Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs to efficiently instantiate the simulation-extractable proof system Π for the relation R sig used in the signing algorithm of our accountable forward-tracing signature scheme. GS proofs operate over bilinear groups and we thus pick suitable primitives for SIG, OTS, and OE. In our instantiation, we let GroupGen on input security parameter 1 λ output the bilinear group G := (q, G 1 , G 2 , G t , e, G,Ĝ) used by Π.Setup. We let SIG, OTS, which will be pairing based, use the same groups, while OE will use (G 1 , q, G) as its (G, q, g ).
Recall the properties of bilinear groups:
• q is a λ-bit prime, • G 1 , G 2 , G t are groups of prime order q with efficiently computable group operations, membership tests, and bilinear mapping e :
and e(G,Ĝ)
generates G t , and
xy .
• an equation of the form i j e(A i , B j ) γij = 1 for constants γ ij ∈ Z p , and constants or variables A i ∈ G 1 , B j ∈ G 2 is called a pairing product equation (PPE for short).
These are exactly the type of equations that can be proved using the GS proof system. Pairing product equations that are linear, that is equations in which variables appear only on one side of the pairing, are more efficient to prove. We use the standard R-or-Sign technique to construct a simulation-extractable proof system Π from GS proofs, SIG and OTS. The left side of the 'or' proves the original statement (this is R sig which we denote S 0 ), while the right side proves knowledge of a signature (σ sim ) under a public key in the crs (we denote this S 1 ). This signature certifies a one-time signature public key, which in turn is used to sign the instance and the GrothSahai proof. For details on the construction we refer to the construction of [7] . For the performance analysis we fall back on [2] :
The number of group elements in a proof of SE-NIZK is counted as follows. Let S 0 = (R sig (x, w) = 1) and S 1 = (Verify sim (pk sim , σ sim , pk ots_sim ) = 1) be the statements of the left and right side respectively, both represented by pairing product equations. The proof size of the SE-NIZK is as follows:
(size of S 0 )+(size of switch)+(size of S 1 )+(size of OT S) We consider the one-time simulation-extractable scheme SE-NIZK4 from [2] and an instantiation based on the xSIG scheme of [1] with unbounded simulation extraction. For these constructions, we summarize the overhead for achieving simulation extractability on top of simply proving the original statement, computed as the sum of equations (2)+(3)+(4), for both DLIN and XDH-based GS proofs in Table 1 .
A.2 Putting it all together
We now examine the actual cost of our ATS scheme. It is dominated by proving the statement for the core relation R sig of our accountable tracing signature scheme (S 0 above).
The equation for the proof size for R sig is given below and the results for various instantiations is summarized in Table 2 .
(size of S 0 )
Where S 0 ({L, C, N L}) are defined as in the same way as S 1 ({L, C, N L}) To reduce the size of epk we use a key-oblivious randomness-reusing variant of ElKO similar to [17] to allow us to efficiently encrypt multiple group elements. Effectively, each group element is encrypted under a distinct key using the same randomness. This results in a ciphertext overhead of only a single group element and thus shorter oblivious keys. (The PPE for verifiable encryption is
Note that keys now correspond to encryptions of vectors of 1. For performance, we instantiate SIG with two different schemes. As discussed above, we can for instance use a general purpose structure-preserving signature scheme (SPS) with secret key csk for the group manager and use an XRMA-secure scheme with secret keys usk for users.
As a further optimization, instead of the complete upk, we encrypt a single unique group element that serves as an identifier of upk. Instead of adding an additional group element to cert, the group manager can reuse one of the random elements of upk by ensuring that it is unique. The user encrypts this element together with σ u , so OE needs to encrypt only |σ u | + 1 group elements, thus |epk| = |σ u | + 2 because of the ciphertext overhead.
An ATS signature σ consists of the elements (π, σ ots , pk ots , escrw). To reduce the overhead, we generate only a single pk ots (and one-time signature σ ots ) and use it both in S 0 and S 1 . In both cases σ ots , respectively σ ots_sim , signed the instance, the proof, and the message. They can thus be merged.
The overall signature size of an ATS signature is thus the sum of the number of group elements needed to prove R sig , the simulation-extraction overhead, and the ciphertext size |escrw| = |epk|. In our example instantiations it ranges from 155 to 367 group elements. Because of the availability of a large number of structure-preserving primitives, there is plenty of room for optimization, especially when one is aiming for both efficiency and weak cryptographic assumptions. We stress, moreover, that our instantiation does not make use of random oracles in its security proof. Proof. We now proceed to describe a sequence of hybrid experiments.
B Proofs
-0 . The original AuT game. -1 . Same as 0 , except that in the Ch oracle we use Sim to simulate π b in σ b and store the simulated proof along with its inputs in a log LS. By the zero-knowledge property of the proof system, the attacker has a negligible advantage in distinguishing between this and the previous game. -2 . Same as 1 , except that for proofs π ∈ LS we answer with the stored data from the simulator. For π / ∈ LS we use extraction to answer OPEN oracle queries without using the decryption key in gsk. If this fails we abort. Because Π is simulation extractable, by definition the probability of failing to extract on a proof that was not directly produced by the simulator (i.e. is not in LS) is negligible, and hence so is the probability of abort and the attacker's advantage in distinguishing between this and the previous game. -3 and 4 correspond to 2 and 3 of the anonymity with accountability proof.
In 4 , all inputs to A are independent of b and its advantage is therefore zero. Proof. Informally, causing Judge to validate is the same as forging one of the two signature in ψ. This is assumed impossible for secure signature schemes.
Theorem 14 (Traceability
The proof is thus nearly identical to that of traceability, except that A already provides σ u as part of his output and it is thus does not need to extracted. For the hybrids see 3 and 4 of the traceability proof. Proof. We proceed through a sequence of hybrids.
Theorem 18 (Anonymity with accountability
-0 . The original AwA game. -1 . Same as 0 , except that we replace the zeroknowledge proofs by simulated proofs. By the zeroknowledge property of the proof system, the attacker has a negligible advantage in distinguishing between this and the previous game. Proof. We proceed through a sequence of hybrids.
-0 . The original trace-obliviousness game. -1 . Same as 0 , except that we change OPEN to invoke the extractor for Π to decrypt escrw instead of using the private key. The attacker has a negligible advantage in distinguishing between this game and 0 by the extractability of the proof system. -2 . Same as 1 , except that we change Enroll in ENROLL to return freshly generated public keys instead of randomized keys.
Lemma 22. By the key randomizability property of ElKO, the new key is indistinguishable from the old one.
In 2 the output of all oracles is independent of b, and therefor the adversary's advantage is zero.
B.2 Proofs of supporting lemmas
Proof Lemma 4. Given an attacker A = (A 0 , A 1 ) who breaks KPr we construct a distinguisher D for DDH. Given Diffie-Hellman's random self-reducibility, if X, Y, T is a Diffie-Hellman triple, then so is X 1 , Y 1 , T 1 . Moreover, both triples are distributed identically regardless and produce the proper distributions of keys in ElKO. In the case that T is a random group element, then the challenge ciphertext given to A contains no in-
